Tag: Security

How has cryptography quality of the top 2000 Android and iOS applications evolved over the past three years? We show an overview of used hashing functions and symmetric encryption algorithms now and then. The results indicate that the majority of apps still use insecure cryptography.

Cryptography algorithms are applicable in many use cases such as for example encryption, hashing, signing. Cryptography has been used since centuries, some cryptography algorithms have been proven to be easily breakable (under certain configurations or conditions) and should thus be avoided. It is not easy for a developer with little cryptographic background to choose secure algorithms and configurations from the plenitude of options. Cryptographic agility is the ability exchange (insecure) cryptography algorithms with secure ones in computer programs.

Analysis Environment & Apps

The analysis results are based on the Appicaptor analysis results of the top 2000 Android and iOS apps. Appicaptor analyzed the current versions of the top 2000 apps along with the three-year-old counterpart of the respective apps. The apps are grouped into top apps from the top 2000 list and business apps uploaded or requested by Appicaptor customers.

Used Hashing Functions

Hashing functions such as MD5 and its predecessors as well as SHA1 are long known to be insecure and prone to collision attacks. It is advised by NIST to move to more secure alternatives like SHA224 or up to SHA512.

The used hashing functions in business apps and the top apps for iOS and Android were analyzed to see the current situation. Afterwards, the 2019 version of the apps is compared to the 2022 version to show the trend for cryptographic agility.

Surprisingly, outdated SHA1 and MD5 hashing is still found in 70% to 80% of the analyzed apps and thus the most used hashing algorithms in iOS and Android in both, the top and business app groups. Even the long outdated MD2 algorithm is still used in 5% to 10% of all apps. These are alarming news regarding security. SHA256 is the only used, yet secure algorithm which is as widespread as MD5 and SHA1.

Comparing hashing in top and business apps, one can see that business apps use less hashing functionality in general.

Looking at the evolution of the top apps on Android and iOS from 2019 to 2022, one can see that the usage of MD5 and SHA1 mostly remains constant with only slight variations. On Android, the SHA2 family and especially SHA512 usage increased. In the case of SHA512, the usage in apps doubled, which is at first sight a positive trend. However, since the usage of outdated algorithms remains constant, one must say, that only more hashing algorithms are used and secure algorithms are not replacing the outdated ones. On iOS, the situation is vice versa: The usage of the SHA2 family even declines which leads to the assumption that less hashing is used on iOS.

In conclusion, one can say that even though Android developers embracing the SHA2 family, outdated hashing functions constantly and heavily remain in Android and iOS apps.

Used Symmetric Encryption Algorithms

As one would expect, AES is the most widely used symmetric encryption algorithm. DES and 3DES are used in around 3% of the analyzed apps. One exception is DES in Android which still seems very popular with a usage in around 12% of the tested apps. Throughout the years, DES and 3DES usage remains mostly constant. However, looking at AES usage over time, one can see that the usage in Android increases in the latest app versions, while at the same time the AES encryption in iOS decreases.
Especially on Android, a discrepancy between business and top apps becomes obvious. Business apps seem to use less AES and slightly more DES encryption.

Usage AES in Insecure ECB Mode

Usage of the ECB mode is a very common weakness when applying cryptography. ECB mode outputs the same ciphertext for the same plaintext (when the same key is used). This means that pattern are not hidden very well and one could draw conclusions on the plaintext. With other techniques like CBC or CTR mode, succeeding block’s encryption depend on one another, which introduces randomness and hides pattern.
We are aware that under certain conditions the usage of ECB mode is fine, but we advise against using it since secure conditions might easily become insecure during app upgrades, code restructuring or new requirements.

We visualize the usage of insecure ECB mode versus other modes. In the visualization we lay focus on the explicit transition of used secure and insecure modes from 2019 to 2022.

Looking at the transitions for Android top apps, we see that 48.9% ECB mode usage in 2019 shrinks to 32.3% in 2022, which is very positive. One can also see that many apps shift from ECB mode to other secure modes. However, a small percentage of apps used secure cryptography in 2019, are now using ECB in 2022.

The situation on iOS looks much different. The transition diagram shows that out of the top apps on iOS, only 12% use ECB mode in 2019 and the majority uses secure alternatives. However, after three years, things didn’t turn out well for iOS apps. With 16% for top apps and 12% on business apps in 2022, more apps are using insecure ECB mode compared to 2019. Even though numbers increased on iOS, ECB usage on Android is still far more widespread, but decreases.

Causes of ECB mode usage

From all observations, we find the transitions from secure (non-ECB) to insecure (ECB) cryptography and vice versa very interesting. Understanding reasons for the transitions could give hints on how developers could be lead towards better cryptography standards. The transitions from ECB to non-ECB and non-ECB to ECB is significantly strong in Android top apps.

A more in-depth analysis of these apps reveals that in around 90% of the cases, the transition from ECB or towards ECB is triggered by an included third-party library. On iOS in 70% of the cases the transition is triggered through third-party libraries and in 30% of the cases through code changes of the app developer.

Different Android third-party libraries which cause the transition from an insecure to a secure cryptography mode and vice versa were analyzed. The transition from ECB to non-ECB is pretty clear, 98% of the apps discontinued using ECB due to not using Google GMS Advertisement library anymore. In 2% of the apps, the respective library was not identifiable due to obfuscation. The pie charts also show which libraries triggered the ECB usage in 2022 apps. Leading with 29% is Google GMS Advertisement library followed by Icelink (12%), Microsoft Identity (10%) and Apache Commons (10%). Respective apps were deeper analyzed, to see if ECB was introduced through a third-party library update or just by adding a new third-party library with ECB usage. In fact, in 92% of the cases libraries with ECB usage were added and only in 8% of the cases a third-party library update introduced ECB.

Conclusion

This analysis has proven that the majority of apps still use insecure cryptography. The trend over the past years unfortunately shows no significant drift towards secure algorithms on the broad front. Some single aspects like ECB usage on Android point into the right direction. The detailed analysis in finding causes of the ECB usage on Android showed that this flaw is mostly introduced through the usage of third-party libraries during app development.

Sources

The contents of this blog post is a condensed version of the award-winning paper published at the international ICISSP 2023 Conference. The full paper can be viewed at Scitepress.

The Content Security Policy (CSP) defines restrictions for webviews to reduce the attack surface of applications for Cross Site Scripting (XSS) and other attacks. The stricter the policy is configured, the fewer possibilities remain for attackers to inject malicious functionality in case of input validation flaws. This is especially important for hybrid apps, such those build with Cordova, that use JavaScript to access granted OS functionality via a JavaScript bridge. If an attacker can inject own code to a hybrid app’s webview, he can alter the way how the app uses accessible data and sensors.

A strict CSP can prevent the execution of injected functionality by restricting the executable code fragments to resources that are less accessible to an attacker. However, strict restrictions also require alternative programming styles during app development, which sometimes are inconvenient or unknown to the developer. Additionally, some external libraries or other existing code may not work out of the box with restrictive CSP settings, increasing the pressure for using a less restrictive policy.

With Appicaptor we inspect apps for configured CSPs to evaluate the restrictions for the security of the app. A single missing sanitation of user input may render a hybrid app vulnerable for hijacking of the app’s functionality in a malicious way. As the vulnerabilities can be introduced to apps by a missing ‘S’ for the HTTPS scheme when loading external JavaScript resources or by a flawed sanitation of user input, hybrid apps should reduce these risks by applying a ready to use second line of defense using CSPs. However, 60.5% of the analyzed hybrid apps for iOS and 72.3% of the hybrid apps for Android do not define a CSP. The analyzed app set each consists of the most used 2,000 apps as ranked by the Android and iOS App Stores.

One might consider a ratio of more than 25% for hybrid apps that do use CSP as a second line of defense an already good starting point. However, analyzing the actual CSPs of these apps shows that many policies are weak. In iOS 39.5% (Android: 27.6%) of the hybrid apps with a CSP deactivate important protective restrictions and therefore could be rated equally to apps with no defined CSP from the perspective of an attacker. So let’s see why.

This is a typical basic example of an observed CSP:

<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'self' data: 'unsafe-inline'; img-src *;"> 

CSPs are constructed in a simple fashion: Each section starts with the source keyword the directive should be applied to and is terminated with a semicolon. In the example the CSP starts a directive section with the default-src keyword. Its declared restrictions are used as fallback for other, not defined directives. For example, the directive for script-src and object-src are not declared, so the configuration of 'unsafe-inline' is applied to both of them, but not to 'img-src', as it is declared in the example and therefore the fallback to 'default-src' is not applied by the browser.

The intention here is to allow loading sources only from 'self', which is the source where the HTML page with the CSP entry was loaded from, to prevent injection of external scripts for Cross Site Scripting. Only images are allowed to be loaded from any source, declared by star character in the img-src directive.

However, by declaring the keyword 'unsafe-inline', this CSP allows executing JavaScript code injected at any place in an HTML page, such as

User entered <script>doSomethingBad();</script> text 

or

<div onclick="doSomethingBad();">Click Me</div>

Allowing 'unsafe-inline' together with the data: scheme for the object-src in the example allows an attacker to inject script code to <object>, <embed>, and <applet> elements:

<object data="data:text/html,<script>doSomethingBad();</script>"></object>

or by using JavaScript inside an SVG, embed as data: URL:

<embed src="data:image/svg+xml,<svg onload='doSomethingBad();' xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg'></svg>" type="image/svg+xml" width="1" height="1" /> 

Fortunately, in most common cases the code injected via data: scheme is treated as a separate frame. It cannot interact with the JavaScript bridge of a hybrid app, which is located in the parent index.html page and the Same Origin Policy prevents the access to it. However, attackers can still use this for UI manipulation attacks by tricking users to disclose credentials or other critical data in crafted dialogs.

Besides many other possible shortcomings observed CSP are having regarding inline XSS protection, about 10% of the analyzed hybrid apps (iOS / Android) do not properly restrict the sources for loading scripts. This is caused by using the star character as a wildcard for the scheme. This way an attacker would be able to inject a script element that can load malicious code from any domain. The same applies if instead the scheme https: is used. It seems that this configuration option is too confusing for developers as for some it might look like as if this configuration would just prevent HTTP access. However, if used it allows access to any domain via HTTPS. So, when some developers use the https: together with a list of domain names they want to allow, this domain list does not have any effect, as any domains are already allowed:

default-src 'self' data: https: ssl.gstatic.com maps.google.com;

Such ineffective domain restrictions were observed in about 7% (iOS / Android) of the analyzed hybrid apps, which might give a false sense of security. Instead, the developer would need to specify the protocol together with the scheme (e.g. https://ssl.gstatic.com) to restrict access to listed domains and allow this access only via HTTPS.

Unfortunatly, in about 5% (iOS / Android) of the analyzed hybrid apps also parsing errors were detected that can prevent the intended protection. In general, such parsing errors could lead to more strict or less strict restrictions, depending on which part of the CSP is affected. However, as more strict policies that are accidentally created are more likely to cause functional issues than in the case of accidentally created less strict policies, the chance is much higher that those issues are detected in functional testing. For example, we observed parsing errors that prevent some or all directives from being applied. In all these cases, the errors lead to a less strict CSP, e.g. by omitting a good strict default-src directive that is now missing for a secure fallback for other non-specified directives.

CSPs can have a strong impact on app security. They are especially important for hybrid apps. The analysis results show that it is important to check if apps do use a CSP and that the CSP needs to be evaluated carefully. In case of doubt, developers should check the CSP with a free tool such as the Google CSP Evaluator to better understand the impact of the directives and to prevent parsing flaws.